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DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND ETHNIC EXCLUSION: 
THE CASE OF THE ZEZURU INFORMAL ECONOMY IN 
BOTSWANA
                                                       Tshepo T. GWATIWA 
      Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva
ABSTRACT   This article discusses Botswana’s development policies and its silent exclusion 
of minority groups, particularly the Zezuru. Focusing on the case of the Zezuru, the paper seeks 
to demonstrate that historical ethnic discrimination and exclusion has blinded the government’s 
economic diversification strategy. It draws a parallel between government policies and 
negligence in particular projects that fall within the scope of the diversification strategy. It 
discusses the government’s failure to engage the Zezuru into modernizing their informal 
economy. It also discusses the lack of Zezuru access to the venture capital provided by 
government meant to improve the formal economy. It looks into the fiscal risks and lost benefits 
to the government while the Zezuru informal economy remains strong. The author conclusively 
argues that the economic exclusion of the Zezuru in development policy implementation is a 
setback in the overall diversification strategy.
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INTRODUCTION 
Botswana is a democratic middle-income state located at the heart of the South-
ern African Development Community (SADC). It gained independence from 
Britain in 1966. Before independence, its GDP per capita income was US$60, 
among the three poorest nations in the world. Great Britain had not economically 
invested in the country, having perceived it as barren of natural resources. Hence 
the country only inherited UK￡7,000 and 2 km of tarred road from Great Brit-
ain (Masire & Lewis, 2006). The discovery of diamonds in Botswana turned its 
fortunes. It’s GDP per capita income rose to US$80 in 1966, and currently stands 
at US$7,500 (Nocera, 2008). Some observers note that prudent fiscal and mone-
tary policies coupled with good governance led to relative prosperity in Botswana 
(Leith, 2005: 2–12). The country thus attained its current middle-income status 
economy among African nations.
There have been few government measures attempted, hence little progress, in 
dealing with the economic setback from the global recession of 2008. Conteh 
(2008) argues that Botswana’s macroeconomic indicators tend to hide the struc-
tural factors that account for the poverty rate that stands at 40%. The reality has 
been much grimmer. First, as a result of the recession, the top two buyers of 
Botswana’s diamonds, the USA and Japan, have been unable to maintain diamond 
purchase quotas. Second, in 2011, beef, the second largest export earner, was sus-
pended by the European Union due to failure in meeting new standards (Tabane, 
2011). Third, tourism, the third largest sector, faced stiffer regional competition 
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from South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, as a result of the increased cost of 
living in Botswana (TICAD, 2009: 25). Perhaps the principal failure dates back 
to the lethargic engagement in development policies when Botswana had a regional 
economic advantage (Lange, 2004). Nevertheless, the author argues that the worst 
problem has been the government’s inability to adopt a development strategy to 
practically engage in an all-inclusive industrial indigenization policy. More often 
than not, the development strategy has been encapsulated in an intricate process, 
characterized by ethnic politics of invisibility and indifference. 
Ethnicity plays a major but silent role in Botswana’s development process. It 
is important to downplay the myth of a homogenous Botswana society where 
development resources are evenly distributed (Molefe & Mguni, 2000). There is 
evidence of an ethnic bias in wealth distribution, whereby the minorities often 
have less access to economic resources and thus rely on government welfare sys-
tems or other subsidies that grossly reduce their economic activities to subsistence 
levels (Good, 2003). Negligence of, discrimination against, and invisibility of some 
minority groups is a continuing problem as a result of early post-independence 
attempts to assimilate the non-Tswana speaking groups into the larger Tswana 
speaking groups, which comprise about 75 percent of the current population (Nyati-
Ramahobo, 2008). One particular ethnic minority that remains largely marginal-
ized is the Zezuru community. Ironically, they remain a highly entrepreneurial 
ethnic group whose informal economy evinces success in some of the sectors that 
the present policies aim to develop in the mainstream society: manufacturing, tex-
tiles and services. However, as a result of the ethnic discrimination and exclusion, 
(a) the Zezuru enterpreneurship is underutilized as a model for the implementa-
tion of schemes in which the government spends millions (b) the community is 
underutilized as a reference, and (c) the people are neglected in the broader con-
sultations aimed at identifying solutions for the diversification of the diamond-
dependent economy. This is a case of ethnic exclusion presenting costs to broader 
development objectives.
This article focuses on the Zezuru economic reality in Botswana for several 
reasons. The Zezuru form a more interesting study because their case encompasses 
the three analytic components of ethnic minority, informal economy, and economic 
exclusion. While other studies have fully discussed the politics of ethnic minori-
ties in Botswana, they have been limited to the political and social dimensions 
without a full exegesis of the economic aspects (Werbner, 2004; Van Waarden, 
1988; Mwakikagile, 2010; Van Binsbergen, 1994). The Zezuru have, for no appar-
ent reason, not been at the epicentre of these discussions. Although there are 
anthropological confluences between the Zezuru and the Kalanga, that is not the 
focus of this paper (Tshambani, 1979). 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The present corpus underpinning international and sustainable development can 
be best captured within the non-traditional security discourse. Not only has the 
UN taken on this conceptual view, other countries such as Japan, Canada and now 
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even Switzerland and the European Union commission have embraced it (Mac-
Farlane & Khong 2006). Human security discourse involves approaches that accom-
modate or exclude government involvement in the empowerment of local popula-
tions. One group posits that the state should remain central to the attainment of 
human security goals (Peou, 2009). The other group posits that human security 
objectives must be pursued beyond the realms and auspices of the state (Umegaki 
et al., 2009). In the case of Botswana there is certainly no way the government 
can be absent from human security initiatives for a plethora of reasons, one of 
which is that the small and impoverished population is scattered over a vast mass 
of land. Moreover, there is no visible rationale to debate development policy with-
out the state of Botswana. 
In recent scholarly debates, there are arguments regarding the role of indigenous 
institutions and populations in development. Some point out that development chal-
lenges in Africa result from the negligence and underutilization of indigenous 
human and intellectual capital (Ayittey, 2006). This takes the debate away from 
meta-theoretical levels, notably the world systems theory, which often point to 
external causes such as neo-colonialism, wherein former colonial powers maintain 
control over the economies of their former colonies (Noble, 2000: 192).(1) It accom-
modates the view that, contrary to neo-colonial arguments, Africa has always been 
a capitalist society with free trade relying on free markets (Ayittey, 1992; Snow, 
1988). The problem is the failure to indigenize the process of development. This 
failure is appositely captured by the parallel success of Asian development where 
indigenous or local systems and practices were aptly combined with those of the 
modern and economic. One view stated that, “Americans believe in ‘consumer 
economics’ while Japanese believe in ‘producer economics’” (Chen, 1995: 36). In 
a similar manner, the Korean development case owes part of its success to a sim-
ilar development economics realignment process named “complementarity” (Aoki, 
1994). Herein lies a case of conflict of loyalties in economics. Similarly, in 
Botswana the Zezuru as one of the most entrepreneurial minorities are neglected, 
especially in the preference for invoking external forms of economics. However, 
the idea here is not that the Zezuru exhibit a unique model in economics, but 
rather, the invocation of the Japanese and Korean analogy seeks to underscore the 
need to build third world economies from within, improving them based on inter-
national standards so as to engraft them onto the broader international political 
economy, and make them adhere to the best practices of developed countries. 
The systemic exclusion of ethnic minorities in the development process is cap-
tured by a number of authors. In the most extreme and common case is the delib-
erate exclusion of minorities in the development process through means of depri-
vation, while minorities are allowed to develop in the least sense to a predeter-
mined ceiling that changes systematically with time (Smith, 1981; Levenstein, 
2004). The conceptual case here is whether or not the Zezuru community is per-
ceived as an ethnic minority. They are first and foremost citizens of a democratic 
society. In the second place, development in a democratic state is inclusive and 
needs to support the aspirations of the people. The state cannot discriminate. More-
over the state has no legitimate grounds to sieve who can or cannot constitute the 
vanguard of a reformist course. Such economic exclusion, especially of a social 
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nature, betrays not only the upholding of human rights but the constitutional fab-
ric of Botswana which, as a democratic republic, proffers equal economic oppor-
tunity and treatment (Constitution of Botswana: Sections 3–19, Sections 20–29).
ANALYTICAL APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
This article adopts analytic eclecticism as the primary analytical base. Analyti-
cal eclecticism is a pragmatist approach that seeks to find middle ground between 
strong theoretical assumptions and practice, by avoiding “more narrowly parsed 
research puzzles” meant to fit certain theoretical arguments (Sil & Katzenstein, 
2008: 412). The constituent idea is that this paper does not seek to advance a 
strong theoretical thread in minority studies, but seeks to discuss the subject on 
a more empirical level that leans closer to policy issues than concerns with theo-
rems. In essence, this approach is “a commonsensical approach to research” which 
is largely adopted in international studies (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009: 708–
709). This approach also comprises what is perceived as event analysis, which 
works by deriving logical arguments from a phenomenon and inductively proceed-
ing to derive causal impressions from a given phenomenon (Bernard & Ryan, 
2010: 326–331). This analytic approach is thus preferred by the author in order 
to retain empirical sharpness and relevance in the discussion at hand, rather than 
have them lost in theoretical debates. This is because the paper is at best a the-
ory-affirming case study and does not present a radical departure from the already 
existing theoretical frameworks and corpus on minority studies.
The broader methodology largely remains qualitative, and does not engage in 
econometrics. It is a combination of a historical approach and survey analysis. 
The historical aspect makes use of the literature on the history of Botswana as 
well as that of the minorities found in Botswana, including the Zezuru. The sur-
vey analysis includes the use of data from primary and secondary documentary 
sources. Primary sources include policy papers and statistical data. Secondary 
sources of data include published papers on the subject of development policy, 
economic diversification, minority politics of Botswana, as well as carefully selected 
(non-polemic) press articles on the subject of the Zezuru. This study also includes 
an ethnographic element that involves observations and immersion that constitutes 
interviews sporadically conducted between the areas of Francistown and 
Gaborone. (2) These were conducted in 2008 prior to my graduate program and 
from April to June in 2011 during my graduate program.
DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION 
The Botswana economy faced its first major challenges in 1990. The recession 
that ensued during that period undermined the economic growth that was heavily 
reliant on mining. The double-digit GDP growth ceased as its European and Amer-
ican markets incurred huge setbacks from the recession (Valentine, 1993a). The 
economy recovered and continually relied on mineral exports, buttressed by beef 
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exports and tourism. However, a key turnaround in 1990 was the fall of the Soviet 
Union. Botswana’s distinction as the only thriving democracy in Southern Africa 
faded. More countries democratized in the region: Namibia in 1990, followed by 
South Africa in 1994 and the end of the Angolan civil conflict in 2002. Subse-
quent to the stabilization of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
trade within the region improved significantly between South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Malawi, Angola, and Mozambique (Chauvin, 2004: 29–32). Better governance and 
improved infrastructure also resulted in more foreign direct investment for other 
countries such as Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, yet Botswana 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) witnessed steady, or worse, declin-
ing investment (Kibasomba, 2004: 110–113). Botswana became less competitive 
due to higher production costs, insufficient human capital, and higher taxes. 
Botswana’s inability to learn from its regional neighbours posits questions about 
its development policy. First, unlike Mauritius, Botswana did not foresee the need 
to diversify the economy while it had a regional political advantage. Mauritius 
diversified its economy away from mono-crops to textiles and manufacturing indus-
tries to build a modern economy in the 1970s, resulting in a more equal society 
(Mistry & Treebhoohun, 2009; Sawkut, 2008). Botswana maintained a diamond-
led economy for more than two decades, and failed to pursue an integrated econ-
omy. This has resulted in an enclave development model centred on mineral 
resources, which also led to inequalities that placed Botswana next to Namibia as 
the world’s most unequal societies (Sentsho, 2003). Second, while Botswana and 
Seychelles shared a history of a mixed economy based on parastatal corporations,(3) 
most of those in Seychelles converted into internationally competitive private com-
panies (McKee et al., 2000: 160–163). The privatization of the Botswana’s four-
teen parastatal corporations has stalled since the late 1990s, for political, demo-
graphic and market reasons (Jeffries, 1995; Dunning, 2005; Good & Hughes, 2002). 
It is not clear if Botswana intends to make privatization a major part of its eco-
nomic diversification strategy. The readiness of groups including invisible ethnic 
minorities to broaden the private sector begs this question.
Botswana sustained a stable economy over a number of decades. However, since 
the late 1990s there have been concerns about the modernization of the economy. 
In 2002, then President Festus Mogae, summarized this necessity in the following 
words:
The primary focus of Botswana has been to prepare Botswana for a tran-
sition from a traditional agro-based economy to an industrial one… a 
diversified and expanded curriculum that includes subjects such as Busi-
ness Studies, Art [and Design], Design and Technology and Computer 
Studies would enhance the development of entrepreneurial and employ-
ment skills among school leavers. (Lauglo & Maclean, 2005: 11–12)
From 2009 the government of Botswana, under President Ian Khama, President 
Mogae’s successor, subsequently introduced the Economic Diversification Drive 
(EDD) initiative. Some economists and analysts have highlighted some of the main 
challenges facing the EDD. Some pointed out that the development policies under 
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this initiative “have been piecemeal, fragmented and uncoordinated” (Sekwati, 
2011: 6). Sekwati further explained the infeasibility of the economic diversifica-
tion drive: First, the process is heavily politicized with the Office of the President 
leaving little room for the private sector to be truly in charge of the process. Sec-
ond, the government is reluctant to fully engage institutions such as the Univer-
sity of Botswana and Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis for 
research and development, resulting in parallel policy formulation and analysis 
processes. This incongruence raised questions as to whether the EDD is purely a 
political project that does not require scientific input from the available intellec-
tual capital in order to ensure its success.
Some of the initiatives other than the EDD did not make a serious contribution 
to the economy, yet the official statistics obscure these realities. For example, 
Botswana’s larger share of the overall population is in the rural areas, yet the 
local government employment share is low, failing to create employment. Fig. 1 
below seeks to represent employment creation in Botswana according to different 
sectors of the economy. 
Fig. 1. Sectorial Employment Distribution (Source: Central Statistics Office, 2012)
The problem with this graph is that it also includes the number of those employed 
under the Ipelegeng programme. Ipelegeng, a reincarnation of the Drought Relief 
Programme, provides cheap labour for government development projects such as 
roads maintenance and other manual labour at the local government level. These 
forms of employment fall under the responsibility of the local government. Accord-
ing to some economists, their remuneration stands at P500 (US$57) per month, 
far below the minimum wage and not qualifying as a formal employment creation 
(Selatlhwa, 2013). A review of the programme by the Botswana Institute for Devel-
opment Policy Analysis (BIDPA) revealed that it is unsustainable, inconsistent with 
government development policy and does not address poverty eradication (BIDPA, 
2012). These projects often do not generate any form of revenue or promote indus-
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One of the problems with Botswana’s development story is that the statistics 
often obscure the grotesque underlying economic realities (Manatsha & Maharjan, 
2009). The aforementioned is a far-reaching and persisting phenomenon also 
reflected in Figure 2 below and the attending analysis: 
Fig. 2. Industry Employment Statistics (Source: Central Statistics Office, 2012)
The graph above gives the impression that many citizens are employed in the 
wholesale and retail sector. It obscures the fact that most wholesale and retail 
businesses are run by Indians and Chinese merchants, who often employ their fel-
low citizens in the top tiers and underpay many Batswana (Ookeditse, 2012). The 
statistics under manufacturing also does not elucidate whether or not the manu-
facturing sector is diversified. There are other politics regarding ownership and 
control of the hotel and tourism sector, which are beyond the scope of this article. 
The vulnerability of Botswana’s economy is evinced by its reliance on uncer-
tain sources of revenues, namely, the South Africa-based and controlled Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU), [which is a revenue sharing mechanism for for-
mer Common Rand Area(4) countries, from which Botswana gets 17% of its GDP (5)] 
and mineral resource revenues. Much of the discourse on Botswana’s miracle 
growth tells a small fraction of the story and often obscures long-term challenges. 
Apart from SACU revenues, Botswana’s economy is heavily reliant on diamonds. 
Diamonds roughly constitute 77.43% of Botswana’s mineral revenue (Department 
of Mines, 2002: 9). The acme of development in Botswana is the good manage-
ment of fiscal, natural and mineral resources, mainly diamonds in this case, as 
well as very low levels of corruption as compared to other African countries 
(Mbaku, 2007: 84–116). However, there are some challenges. First, the constitu-
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limited contribution to the GDP. The largest source of Botswana’s revenues has 
been the SACU, followed by mineral revenues and then the profits from the Bank 
of Botswana, i.e. reserve bank (Modise, 1999: 77–91). With the future of SACU 
and diamonds sales uncertain, Botswana, especially given the small private sector, 
faces the threat of losing a large share of its revenue sources. Second, Botswana 
like most economies based on resource extraction, has higher levels of inequality 
and poverty (Clover, 2003). The Incomes Policy of 1972, which was meant to 
avoid rapid wage escalation and reduce income disparities and social disharmony, 
has hardly been implemented and failed to achieve its objectives (Siphambe, 2007: 
23–24). Third, the undiversified economy is not sustainable as the future of dia-
monds becomes more uncertain, if one draws inference from the collapse of the 
Zambian economy until then solely reliant on copper, as Botswana is currently 
reliant on diamonds. The future of customs revenues, which is likely to be repealed 
by both the reformation of SACU and the proposed SADC Free Trade Zone, is 
also not certain (Ihonvbere, 1996). These factors heighten the need to diversify 
the economy.
The primary question is why the government of Botswana has ignored the role 
of the informal sector. In 2007, the Central Statistics Office published a study that 
indicated that the informal sector had grown by 72% between 1999 and 2007 
(Moseki, 2009). A study conducted under the aegis of the Botswana Institute for 
Development Policy Analysis also attested to the fact that the informal sector has 
contributed to poverty alleviation as the income of those involved in it increased 
significantly (Kapunda & Mmolawa, 2004). Since the early 2000s there have been 
attempts by the government to promote the role of small and medium and micro-
enterprises (SMMEs) and nurture good markets for them. The Zezuru are involved 
in small scale manufacturing and textile activities, yet the government has not 
made efforts to integrate them into the larger economy leaving them in the infor-
mal, hence unregulated economy (Ookeditse, 2011). As a result, this fraction of 
the informal economy remains ethnocentric, without prospects of creating more 
employment in manufacturing services as well as broadening the tax revenue base. 
Although the subject of Botswana’s informal economy would entail a discussion 
of more ethnic groups, this paper will limit itself to that of the Zezuru. 
In order to investigate these factors, it is important to situate them in the con-
text of Botswana’s ethnic politics. The paper focuses on the Zezuru case in pref-
erence to other cases of minority groups such as the Kalanga, Wayeyi, Basubiya 
and Baherero, because they are the most entrepreneurial group in Botswana (Ookedi-
tse, 2008). Furthermore, they are the only minority group that fits within a frame-
work integrating minority, and entrepreneurial or informal economic activity. Thus 
the exclusion of other groups is by no means coincidental.
ZEZURU MIGRATION INTO BOTSWANA: HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Botswana became a British protectorate in 1885, then known as Bechuanaland 
Protectorate. This decision followed repeated requests to become a protectorate by 
leading paramount chiefs of Tswana ethnic groups. The Tswana groups, whose 
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leaders had sought the protectorateship, were ipso facto given a higher status in 
the protectorate (Manungo, 1999: 26). It was logical for them to be the first con-
tact of the British authority. Given the lack of the protectorate’s economic value, 
the primary incentive behind colonialism, there was no serious administrative role 
over the protectorate. The first capital was in Vryburg, in present day South Africa, 
and the second capital was based in Mafikeng, also in present day South Africa. 
The Bechuanaland colonial office was headed by a High Commissioner based in 
distant Cape Town. As a result, current ethnic politics were not the design of the 
colonial office, but of the Tswana speaking groups within the country. 
This power structure gave the Tswana speaking groups more authority while 
more groups moved into Botswana from politically unstable countries. It is impor-
tant to note that Botswana was not yet an independent state when other groups 
moved into the area, which is called present day Botswana. Thus no specific group 
could legitimately claim territorial jurisdiction. In the least, such a concept was 
non-existent. Nonetheless, the name Bechuanaland, insinuated de facto recognition 
of the Tswana groups as custodians of the land. This was a critical juncture that 
set these groups on a path of dependency that led to where Botswana currently 
stands in ethnic politics.
The Zezuru trace their origins from present day Zimbabwe. They are the larg-
est clan of the Shona ethnic group in Zimbabwe. They constitute a quarter of the 
entire Zimbabwean population, with their dialect of Shona considered the most 
preeminent. It is against this background that the Zezuru and Karanga dialects 
(not Kalanga) were preferred over other Shona dialects, such as Korekore, Ndau 
and Manyika, during the standardization of the Shona language in the post-colo-
nial Zimbabwe (Ndhlovu, 2009: 33–34; Stokes, 2009: 755). However, despite being 
the largest Shona group in Zimbabwe and existing in large numbers in Botswana, 
the Zezuru are not even considered an official minority in Botswana.
The Zezuru community in Botswana migrated as a result of political persecu-
tion of a religious group, who followed a Christian leader known as Johane 
Masowe.(6) His movement was driven by a combination of religious and political 
goals aimed at “liberating African natives from colonial oppression” (Engelke, 
2005: 781–782). The movement grew in leaps and bounds earning the name 
“Vapostori,” a Shona version of the term, “apostles.” The central pillar of their 
doctrine is economic self-sufficiency. Prior to migrating to other parts of Southern 
Africa, the group increasingly became identified with social entrepreneurship. The 
common description of the group in Botswana is that they are industrious and 
adhere to a strong work ethic. This is a contrast with the broader society, which 
the Botswana National Productivity Centre (BNPC) often berates for a “poor work 
ethic” (BNPC, 2010; Segaetsho, 2012). This doctrine underpins the economic ways 
of the Zezuru community to this day. 
The group that migrated into Botswana only formed part of the larger move-
ment started by John Masowe. Following the banishing of Masowe to South Africa, 
the movement split within Zimbabwe. One of the splinter groups led by Ebrahim 
Moyo migrated into then Bechuanaland Protectorate in the late 1940s (Makgala, 
2006). They settled in Moroka village, not distant from the border with Rhodesia, 
in the then Tati District. The district is inhabited by the Kalanga ethnic group, 
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which is culturally and linguistically similar to the broader Shona ethnic group. 
Historical records show that the Kalanga were once part of the Mwenemutapa 
Shona dynasty which stretched from the Mashonaland area to present day Boteti 
area in Botswana (Van Waarden, 1988). It was due to the cultural and ethnic sim-
ilarities that the Zezuru found it easier to settle among the Kalanga.
A few changes and search for economic prosperity led them to move to other 
parts of Botswana, particularly preferring and concentrating in the “eastern belt.”(7) 
First, Chief Moroka contracted Ebrahim Moyo and his followers to build a pri-
mary school for the village in exchange for an arrangement to pay taxes three 
years in advance. The tax receipts guaranteed citizenship in Bechuanaland and 
South Africa (Tshambani, 1979, cited in Makgala, 2006). This arrangement angered 
the British colonial office. Second, within a relatively short period the Zezuru 
resented the form of tacit oppression they began to incur as migrants in Moroka. 
It is against this background that they subsequently migrated to Francistown. Fran-
cistown was then a flourishing gold-mining town. It was in Francistown that the 
Vapostori first earned the name “Mazezuru,” which stuck to this day. They sub-
sequently increased in number and settled in other areas such as Mandunyane and 
Shashe before spreading to other economically viable centres including the capital 
city of Gaborone. However, their largest concentrations are found along the “east-
ern belt.”
BOTSWANA’S MODERN ETHNIC POLITICS: TRACING SOCIAL 
EXCLUSION 
Ethnicity issues in present day Botswana are mired in a paradox, to the extent 
that the analysis of its politics presents a serious challenge. First, since 1964, the 
national census does not record ethnic or racial background (Parsons, 1999). Iron-
ically, one cannot infer ethnic or tribal population statistics from those of given 
districts because a district rarely consists of a single tribe. For example, there are 
Xhosa populations scattered all over the country from Francistown (North East), 
through Mahalapye (Central District) to Manyana (Southern Kweneng District). 
The Herero, predominantly found in Ngamiland District, are also concentrated in 
larger numbers in Mahalapye as well as in settlements such as Sechele in North-
East District (Nkala, 2004). The geospatial population of the Zezuru shows a sim-
ilar pattern, and are found throughout the country. As a result, the task of deter-
mining the numeric percentage of the Zezuru becomes more daunting. Second, the 
Botswana government maintains the policy of the constitution that plainly desig-
nates eight Tswana-speaking groups as “majority tribes,” relegating non-Tswana 
speakers to a minority status, including the Zezuru (Constitution of Botswana, 
Sections 77–79). This makes it difficult to debate minority status from a scholarly 
basis. This quagmire renders analysis to a less-quantitative and perhaps ethno-
graphic process.
The compact structure of ethnic politics does not necessarily explain what on 
one hand can be perceived as the social exclusion of the Zezuru. Makgala (2006) 
argues that when the Zezuru settled in Francistown their economic lifestyle appealed 
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to large numbers of the natives. However, the Zezuru embarked on a process of 
ethnic “othering” and discrimination calling the natives “marudzi” (foreigners). 
Several natives sought to join the Zezuru and were expelled from the religious 
movement. The expelled non-Zezuru subsequently moved to other parts of the 
country including the greater Tonota area (Shashe and Mandunyane), while others 
moved to Gaborone and Lobatse. There is not enough evidence to support the 
claim of mass appeal of the Zezuru to the locals: there is no evidence of eco-
nomic exchange nor intermarriage and other elements of cross-cultural influences. 
Contrarily, the Zezuru often live in designated parts of numerous settlements. This 
practice backdates to the 1940s before Botswana became a republic. 
The systemic placement of the Zezuru in the periphery of most of these settle-
ments was caused by ethnic resentment by the Tswana groups and the colonial 
administration’s attempt to control migration. The British colonial office passed 
the “African Immigration Proclamation of 1941” to control African migration into 
Bechuanaland. It stated that all Africans “domiciled south of the Equator may 
enter the protectorate provided [they are] in possession of a pass signed by a per-
son authorized to sign passes” from the sending country (Makgala, 2006: 11). In 
1957, the African Advisory Council (AAC) sought to repeal the law, pointing out 
the implications of “unregulated” migration. Makgala argued that one of the major 
concerns was directed towards the Zezuru. In the historical context of village com-
positions, where the royal lineage proceeded from the nucleus, wards in the periph-
ery were given to alien populations including the Zezuru. This marks the begin-
ning of systemic and ethnic exclusion of the Zezuru. Their invisibility and exclu-
sion continues to this day. The Zezuru are rarely mentioned as an ethnic minority 
in secondary education “social studies” curricula.
It is of interest to note that the constitutional review of Sections 77–79 did not 
change the situation much.(8) For example, it capitalized on the Tswana-based sys-
tem of having a “kgosi,” chief, using the “kgotla” or customary court as a plat-
form for consultation.(9) Furthermore, it gives the minister of local government the 
power to decide which group can be recognized as a tribe (see Bogosi Act 2008: 
Sections 3–7). This is highly problematic on a number of levels. First, it is imper-
ative to note the Tswana-centric nomenclature used in this piece of legislation. 
The Zezuru in Botswana have no equivalent of a “kgosi.” Second, the Bogosi Act 
Section 3(1–2) states that the minister of local govermentshall take into account 
the history and structure of the tribal community before deciding whether to rec-
ognize it as a tribe, and this is to be done in a “kgotla.” As much as the Zezuru 
do not have a “kgotla,” if they are to be consulted in a “kgotla,” it will be bor-
rowed, a symbolism implying tribal subjugation. If the minister of local govern-
ment, takes the tribal histories and structures into consideration, is that not likely 
to further polarize tribal grouping and thus leave groups such as the Zezurus in 
the economic periphery? Since formal economic consultations often extend to the 
“kgotla,” this results in the systemic alienation of some groups, such as the Zez-
uru. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that the government of Botswana 
has challenged or exhorted the Zezuru to establish political structures comparable 
to the“kgotla” or similar to those of other minority groups. If the Zezuru are a 
unique group, what steps has the government extended to ensure that there is no 
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economic exclusion of any group?
The idea of the Zezuru adopting political structures similar to those of other 
ethnic groups pales in the context of the larger problem of ethnic exclusion in 
Botswana. To be sure, there are other minority ethnic groups such as the Kalanga, 
Basubiya, and others that have comparable political structures headed by a “kgosi,” 
yet the constitution retains the primacy of the eight Tswana-speaking tribes, in 
that the chiefs of minority groups are elected while those of the Tswana-speaking 
groups are not. There are still ethnic groups that are not represented in the House 
of Chiefs,(10) despite the fact that the Constitutional Amendment Act of 2005 
increased the number of House seats from 15 to 35 (Ditshwanelo, 2007). These 
changes were of no significant relevance to some minority groups such as the 
Zezuru, as it stands. This not only provides room for political subjugation but 
economic exclusion in the sense that the public consultations on economic pro-
grammes still takes place using the “kgotla” as a platform. Contrary to popular 
belief, the “kgotla” is not entirely inclusive and open, because the youth, the 
employed, and non-conformist public are hardly part of it. Minority groups that 
feel threatened by the powerful tribes will avoid these platforms as it were (Mak-
gala, 2006). This means that minorities such as the Zezuru, among other groups, 
will not economically benefit from the “kgotla” system.
THE INFORMAL ECONOMY OF THE ZEZURU AND BOTSWANA’S DE-
VELOPMENT POLICIES
Entrepreneurship is the mainstay of the Zezuru community. During their early 
days of settling in Botswana, local chiefs entered into contracts to undertake con-
struction projects while the Kalanga natives, who were also under hard labour 
conditions imposed by the BaNgwato tribe and the protectorate administration, 
simply passed projects to the Zezuru (Tshambani, 1979). The attempt to promote 
self-reliance as one of the national principles in post-independence Botswana did 
not materialize, mainly due to the advent of a welfare state. The creation of the 
welfare services did not affect the Zezuru as much as it eluded the mainstream 
society. The reasons for these are simple. First, the Zezuru do not place a pre-
mium on white-collar jobs (Wapitso, 2008). Second, in the author’s observations 
the Zezuru embrace formal education in so far as it can sustain their economic 
lifestyle. In that manner, girls and boys often complete schooling up to junior and 
secondary school, respectively.(11) Subsequently the Zezuru youth forgo public 
school to work in the informal economy that revolves around their ethnic and 
religious movement.
The foremost feature of the Zezuru economy is small-scale manufacturing. The 
intensive labour is often left to males. Small-scale manufacturing is often charac-
terized by woodwork and metal workshops. The Zezuru men make typical furni-
ture that is often sold elsewhere, including chairs, tables, wardrobes, and drawer 
chests (Ookeditse, 2008). The metal products range from household goods such 
as pots, buckets, bathtubs and metal chests to larger products such as metal gates, 
burglar-bars, car bumpers, animal cages and animal or cargo trailers. 
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The Zezuru are also known for their skills in auto and electrical mechanics. 
Many Zezulu men often work as what is known as a “bush mechanic.” They often 
provide mechanical services to lower class clients. However, the concept of eco-
nomic class in Botswana is often evasive because there is a larger number of the 
“working poor” as a result of inflation and higher cost of living (Mogotsi, 2012). 
As a result, those in the lower rungs of the public sector often rely on the mechan-
ical services of the Zezuru because they are cheaper and can be negotiated to 
reasonable prices. The mechanical service extends to the repair of radio and tele-
vision sets and other household electronics. This market revolves around a degree 
of social capital because populaces in Botswana are very small compared to other 
countries where informal economies exist in larger numbers.
The Zezuru often have a marked presence in the transportation industry. In 
Francistown, Gaborone, Lobatse and Selibe-Phikwe, the Zezuru operate taxi or cab 
services. One long-distance express service owned by a Zezuru family is a fleet 
of Zikhale buses. It is important to take note how the Zezuru often help each 
other with start-up capital in setting up these transport business. This is not only 
limited to the transportation business but found in other businesses mentioned 
above. This start-up money is often given to young men in order to attain eco-
nomic self-sufficiency.
The Zezuru investment in financial and resource capital is very minimal, with 
more focus on growth and little urge towards reckless profit making. While the 
formal economy focuses on making profit and becoming more competitive, this 
idea is distant from the Zezuru informal economy. Due to little focus on profit-
making, the Zezuru manufacturing rarely evinces some form of investment in order 
to improve production. That is to say, although there is much buying and selling, 
this economy usually lacks a market-oriented capitalist drive. Questions can arise 
as to why despite years of this robust economic activity, the Zezuru have not 
attempted to upgrade their economic activities to move into larger manufacturing 
industries. Is it because of a lack of knowledge? Is it lack of access to govern-
ment resources given to other citizen, or mere indifference?
There is no study by government agencies or academia to investigate the extent 
to which size the Zezuru informal economy can achieve if it were to be absorbed 
into the mainstream. There has been little effort to take a leaf from research on 
how Japanese keiretsu (family businesses), which developed into zaibatsu, became 
the mainstay of the Japanese economy (Cusumano, 1985). It is inevitable to note 
the extent to which ethnic politics will obscure government policies. To that end, 
the Zezuru will always be left out of any economic diversification policy. Gov-
ernment support of thriving businesses and small and medium enterprises has 
resulted in growth elsewhere (Jwa, 2002). In the absence of the ethnic exclusion 
and discrimination, would the absorption of Zezuru into the formal economy result 
in greater growth for Botswana?
A form of arbitrary pricing plays a critical role in the sales of goods thus 
obscuring the real dividend that can yield from Zezuru production and services. 
Because the informal economy does not have accountability to pay taxes and to 
make profit in a competitive environment, there is often carelessness towards pric-
ing. Whether the price is higher or lower than its actual value makes no differ-
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ence in the informal market. When it comes to manufacturing, the products are 
often of better quality and durability but priced lower than the products from busi-
nesses in the formal sector. This means that the latter loses its market to the infor-
mal sector. The same applies to merchandize that is sold by the female vendors 
who buy fruits from across the border (in Zimbabwe) and sell them at lower or 
higher prices depending on the seller (or sometimes the buyer’s) preferences. If 
regulated, the Zezuru economy would ensure capital asset, and the state would 
generate enough revenues from this formerly untapped service and manufacturing 
sector. 
The presence of the female Zezuru community in the textile industry appears 
to have escaped development policy analysts. BIDPA, the policy think tank, and 
the World Bank commissioned a background study assessing the prospects of the 
textile industry in Botswana (Salm et al, 2004). The study did not include those 
in the informal sector, particularly failing to note the government’s indifference to 
the economic activities of the Zezuru within this subsector. The Zezuru have been 
involved in trading of textiles in the informal sector for years. This role has par-
ticularly been reserved for women in the patriarchal society. It should be of inter-
est why the government has largely promoted gender empowerment within the 
mainstream society but remained oblivious to the plight of women in “obscured” 
minorities. Is it more important to empower women to be more socially assertive 
or empower them to be more economically capable or viable? This failure to help 
a group that is already making headway and capable of improving the broader 
economy, to export levels, pins holes into the government development strategy.
The reasons for the lack of access to government venture capital among the 
Zezuru is open to debate. The government of Botswana has a history of provid-
ing investment or economic incentives. The Financial Assistance Policy (FAP) 
offered all citizens a minimum of P 75,000 (US$9,600) up to a then maximum 
of P 2,000,000 (US$256,200), and included funding for unskilled labour (Valen-
tine, 1993b). In the early 2000s, the grant scheme was converted to a loan scheme 
known as the Citizen Entrepreneurial Development Agency (CEDA) (CEDA, 2011). 
It is rational to interrogate why the government, in its intent to nurture an entre-
preneurial society, avoided challenging the Zezuru into modernizing their entre-
preneurship. It is important to note that educational background and experience 
were neither a prerequisite for FAP grants nor are they a requirement for the pres-
ent CEDA loans and grants as well as the Youth grant that amount to a ceiling 
of P 100,000. These two agencies work in concert with the Local Enterprise 
Authority (LEA) to prepare business proposal and provide training and mentor-
ship (LEA, 2011). This begs the question as to why the local authorities have not 
engaged the Zezuru to aspire for this risk-free start-up capital. If the local and 
central governments have been able to engage the Zezuru over accepting immu-
nization (Modikwa, 2011), which was an enormous endeavour because the Zezulu 
often rejected such medical attention, why do they fail to engage them on more 
pertinent issues of the economy? Is it ethnic bias and exclusion, or a problem in 
government policy? 
It might be useful to broaden the scope within which to interrogate government 
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policy in making use of indigenous knowledge, skills and resources. First, it is 
paradoxical that when the government introduced its economic diversification pol-
icy, the government had already started on a broad centralization policy which 
virtually reduced the powers of local governments, hence alienating minorities 
which are often outside urban areas (Dipholo & Mothusi, 2005). Although the 
Zezuru are also found in urban areas in significant proportions, it is important to 
note the centralization process stripped municipal authorities of development pol-
icy implementation. If a municipality is disempowered then it cannot reach mar-
ginalized group such as the Zezuru. Second, the government may have centralized 
authority and resource, but it alienated the contribution of indigenous knowledge 
and skills that are often found outside the urban areas. Systems meant to ensure 
food security, such as masotla;(12) fisheries among other minorities in the north-
west; and other SMME attempts have faced uncertainty or ended in a complete 
demise, resulting in deeper levels of poverty. Thus, financial resources flow from 
the government with a loss, due to the lack of robust monitoring and support. 
This broader failure explains the gap in the failure to engage different communi-
ties of which the Zezuru are only a part.
CONCLUSION
Neglecting the Zezuru informal economy comes with costs to Botswana’s devel-
opment strategy. The Zezuru community engages in entrepreneurial activities that 
are in line with Botswana’s diversification strategy. The intent has been to increase 
the number of SMMEs and improve existing but weak economies. Not only has 
the government of Botswana failed to improve modernize the informal economy, 
but particularly made no attempts to engage the Zezuru community. The Zezuru 
informal economy remains strong in manufacturing (steel and wood), textiles, 
transport and automotive services. The government has made no attempt to mobi-
lize them to access venture capital that is readily available to citizens in the main-
stream society. Consequently, the government continues to lose plenty of revenue 
as the informal sector grows at a considerable percentage. The exclusion of this 
entrepreneurial minority group means lower quotas for entrepreneurship that could 
employ more people and modernize the economy. This phenomenon is traceable 
to the historical maltreatment of the Zezuru since the genesis of their migration 
in the pre-independence Botswana. Their “invisibility” resulted in economic and 
social exclusion. Despite these conditions, the Zezuru informal economy—born 
out of religious and ethnic beliefs—remains strong and a continues to be a way 
of life for every member of the Zezuru ethnic group. In the absence of an all-
inclusive ethnic policy, and a roll back to silent discriminatory practice and indif-
ference, the Zezuru will remain in the periphery of Botswana’s development strat-
egy. As a result, Botswana will fail to meet its development targets within its 
economic diversification drive. 
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NOTE
(1) Noble quotes Immanuel Wallerstein, who says that “neither the ‘development’ [n]or the 
‘underdevelopment’ of any specific territorial unit can be analysed or interpreted without 
fitting it into the cyclical rhythms and secular trends of the world economy as a whole.”
(2) Gaborone is the capital city, located in the southeastern part of the country. Francistown 
is the second largest city located in the northeastern part of the country.
(3) A parastatal institution or company is one which is partly controlled by government and 
co-administered by a private partnership.
(4) These are Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland where local currencies are pegged to the 
South African Rand. Botswana switched from the Rand to the Pula in 1975, but floats 
close to the Rand.
(5) SACU countries have an external tariff for exports which are collected into the South 
African National Revenue Fund and thereafter shared according to a formula among the 
different countries as per the size of their economies. For a clearer history of SACU rev-
enue sharing formula, see Grynberg & Motswapong, 2003
(6) John Masowe was born Shoniwa Masodze, but changed his name after he claimed to have 
received a divine mandate to liberate African natives from colonial oppression.
(7) The “eastern belt” is a term used in social studies to refer to the mountainous and hilly 
range that stretches from the southeast to the northeast of the country. It is important to 
note that the main railway line built by Cecil John Rhodes stretches along these moun-
tains. Moreover, development and particularly the most populous settlements (including 
urban and semi-urban) are concentrated along this stretch. The rest of major settlements 
(townships, agro-towns and urban villages) are sparsely located to the west of this stretch. 
The Zezuru concentrations are mostly populated along these areas along the railway lines.
(8) As Sections 77–79 designated the eight Tswana-speaking ethnic groups as the major 
“tribes,” the rest were considered subservient to these eight.
(9) The word “kgosi” means “chief” in Setswana. A “kgotla” is a place where the chief exer-
cises his dual functions: On the one hand a “kgotla” is a customary court, and on the 
other, a democratic political forum where members of the public freely express opinions 
before a communal decision is made.
(10) Ntlo ya Dikgosi is a de facto Senate, which advises the parliament on cultural issues. It 
used to be called “The House of Chiefs.” It is an equivalent of the House of Lords in the 
United Kingdom and an equivalent of the Senate in the USA. It seats collective ethnic 
leadership, which comprises female and male traditional kings/chiefs.
(11) It is important to note that in Botswana secondary schooling is divided into two phases. 
The junior secondary school runs from form 1 to form 3. There is a qualifier examination 
to complete the remaining two years of senior secondary school. Failure results in the 
complete disqualification from the formal education system. There are plans to merge the 
two systems, but this political rhetoric has not become policy.
(12) Gaotlhobogwe (2011) wrote that, “Masotla” are pieces of massive land held in trust by a 
“kgosi” for the entire tribe, maintained and ploughed by youth regiments known as 
“mephato.”
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